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PREFACE
The data upon which this study is based have been collected over
a period of several ^ears. Until recently, however, the time did not
seem opportune for the publication of a banking study. Xow that
banking is in a relatively stable condition, it is possible to appraise
past events and perhaps to make some surmises as to the future.
Within the past year or two an increasing number of studies have
been published dealing with various aspects of banking. Some of
these, such as the study of Bank Chartering History and Policies of
the United States by the Economic Policy Commission of the Ameri-
can Bankers Association, have surveyed the situation in the entire
country. There is ample need for more detailed studies of the numer-
ous aspects of banking in the various states. Some of this latter t}'pe
have already appeared. The present study has been undertaken in
order to provide a better understanding of the situation in Illinois.
Some of the ideas on chartering policies were suggested b}" the study
first mentioned.
With little exception, the data for this study were taken from two
main sources. For national banks the primar\- source has been the
Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency, including the
Individual Statements of Condition of Xational Banks. In one or two
instances these have been supplemented by the Abstract of Reports of
Condition of Xational Banks. Data for state banks were taken mostly
from the reports of the Auditor of Public Accounts entitled Statements
Shozi'ing Total Resources and Liabilities of Illinois State Banks.
Additional information regarding state banks was provided by the
Monthly Bulletin issued by the Banking Department under the Auditor
of Public Accounts.
Dr. Clive F. Dunham and Dr. Rexford C. Parmelee, formerly of
the Bureau staff, aided with the initial work on this study. Later, parts
of the work were done by John \'. Machell. Jr.. as well as other
members of the Bureau staff, whose help has been very valuable.
Arthur H. Wixakor
lune. 1937
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I. INTRODUCTION
The present time seems particularly suitable for presenting certain
studies of banking. Unit banking has apparently reached or com-
pleted a definite stage in its development. What the future holds in
store is difficult to say. Analyses of past happenings, however, are
always of value if they point out former weaknesses or in any way
provide a background for the interpretation of current events. It would
be a bold prognosticator, indeed, who would venture the supposition
that our banking difficulties are all in the past. The failure of banking
reforms of recent years to make any fundamental change in the nature
and organization of the banking units and structure warrants a feeling
of uncertainty as to the future. Such uncertainty prompts this study.
After the period when banks expanded both in numbers and in
resources, and after the subsequent contraction and losses, there have
occurred a series of reforms. The full effects of these measures have
not yet had an opportunity to manifest themselves. The question of
whether these reforms are of such a sort that they will avoid or remedy
the weaknesses of the past is still unanswered. This comment is not
made with the intention of minimizing recent banking reforms; rather
the purpose is to assist in placing them in their proper setting for more
adequate appraisal.
This study was undertaken with the purpose of adding some factual
data to those available for answering such questions. The bulletin is
confined to one section of the entire banking structure. Some of the
major changes and influences in banking are omitted, not because they
are unimportant, but because an analysis of them would extend the
scope of the investigation beyond the facilities available.
This study, as the title indicates, is confined to banking in Illinois.
Banking conditions in this state provide a particularly suitable medium
for examination of banking problems and experience. For one thing,
Illinois has experienced rather severe banking difficulties. Furthermore,
it contains a relatively large proportion of the country's banks, includ-
ing the large financial metropolis of Chicago, as well as rural areas with
small banks. This is a true unit-banking state with restrictions against
branch banking, and with limited group or chain banking development.
In respect to certain policies of bank control, Illinois has been a rather
serious offender in the past.
A brief section of the bulletin is devoted to the status of private
banking in Illinois just prior to the state law of 1917 which abolished
private banks and forced them either to take out state or national
8 Bulletin No. 55
charters, or to dissolve. These paragraphs provide a setting for the
main study of corporate banks which follows.
The focus of the study is centered in changes in the numbers and
kinds of banks throughout the period of years, 1921 to 1935. Emphasis
is placed on such aspects of banks as turnover, consolidations, failures,
and chartering policies. In other words, the picture presented concerns
the changes of banking facilities in a broad sense, and is not confined to
failures alone. The availability of banking facilities in various-sized
communities is examined under conditions of changing trends in
banking.
II. PRIVATE BANKING IN ILLINOIS, 1917 TO 1921
In order to provide a background for later topics and also afford a
convenient starting point in the recent banking development of the
state, the banking situation that led to the passage of the state law
abolishing private banks is briefly discussed.
Prior to January 1, 1921, Illinois had a banking system composed
of national banks, state banks, and unincorporated private banks.
Neither the state nor the federal government exercised control or
supervision over these private banks. They were free to operate as
they chose in so far as capital, types of loans made, kinds of invest-
ments, types of deposits, reserves, and the like, were concerned.
Difficulties and abuses among the private banks led to insistence for
reform. The remedy proposed took the form of the "Private Bank
Bill,"^ passed by the state legislature in 1917, approved by the people
in 1918, and effective January 1, 1921.
This act abolished private banking. Since about three years inter-
vened between the passage and the effective date of the act, it is evi-
dent that private bankers had some time to choose whether to cease
operations, or to incorporate as state or national banks.
In June, 1918, there were 511 private banks in Illinois." By 1919
the number had been reduced to approximately 400.^
Since 94 new state bank charters were granted from July, 1917,
through June, 1919, it seems probable that many of the private banks
had already changed over in accordance with the law.* Many more did
likewise in the next year and a half. For the most part the private
banks took out state rather than national charters.
Most of those private bankers w^ho wished to continue in business
took out state charters because of the very liberal provisions as to mini-
mum capital requirements for state banks. In order to facilitate the
change from private banking, the new act made it exceedingly easy for
these banks to obtain charters. Effective December 1, 1920, the capital
requirements set up in the law were as follows for incorporated places:^
^Clarence F. Buck, Illinois Blue Book, 1917-18, p. 65.
^Ibid., p. 65.
'Andrew Russel, Illinois Blue Book, 1919-20, p. 45.
^Statement of Illinois State Banks, December 31, 1921, pp. 24-25.
°"An Act to Revise the Law with Relation to Banks and Banking," Banking
Laiv, State of Illinois, Auditor's Edition, 1921, pp. 8-9.
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Population of Minimum Capital
Community Requirement
500 or less $ 10,000
501 to 1,500 15,000
1,501 to 5,000 25,000
5,001 to 10,000 50,000
10,001 to 50,000 50,000 to 3100,000
More than 50,000 100,000 to 200,000
For unincorporated places, whatever their size, a minimum capital of
$10,000 was permissible.
Prior to 1918 the minimum capital for state banks had been
$25,000 for communities of 5,000 population or less, $50,000 if the
population was 5,000 to 10,000, $100,000 if the population ranged from
10,000 to 50,000, and $200,000 if the population- exceeded 50,000. An
act which became effective in November, 1918, lowered the capital re-
quirements in all groups except those with 5,000 to 10,000 population,
in which the required capital was held at $50,000. Unincorporated
communities were permitted banks with as little as $10,000 capital. In-
corporated towns or villages with less than 1,500 population were per-
mitted to have banks with as little as $15,000 capital. A minimum
capital of $25,000 was authorized in towns and villages of from 1,500
to 5,000 persons. In towns of 10,000 or more the former requirements
were cut in half, but there were restrictions as to the amounts of
deposits which could be accepted with these ininima. And, as was
pointed out in the preceding paragraph, a still lower standard went
into effect on December 1, 1920.
Thus it is evident that the provisions setting capital requirements
had been lowered even before the passage of the bill to facilitate the
incorporation of private banks. The law which became effective on
December 1, 1920, further liberalized capital provisions, setting up two
groups where previously there had been only one. Formerly the banks
in incorporated places of less than 1,500 population were required to
have a capital of $15,000. The new act permitted minimum capital of
$10,000 in incorporated places of less than 500 population, the same
amount as for unincorporated places. In towns and villages of 500 to
1,500 persons, banks had to have capital of at least $15,000, just as
they had before. The net result of these changes was the provisions
which are shown in tabular form above.
These provisions, except for the modification in 1920, were in force
from November, 1918, until December, 1924. They permitted a sharp
lowering of the standards which had been in eft"ect for many years
prior, both as to minimum capital and as to size of community m
which the smaller capital was permissible. These acts did not require
a paid-in surplus in addition to the share capital of the banks.
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Most of these changes were made in the interest of the small
private banks. Without such changes in the law, many of them would
have had no choice but to cease operating. There can be little doubt
that the laxity of these laws gave rise to many bank difftculties in the
following decade. Many of the private banks changed over to corpor-
ate banks, for the most part to state banks. Once having organized
with a small capital, they were not obliged by later acts to increase the
amount. Many of these small banks with meager capital funds were
elements of weakness later. Insufficient capital to absorb unusual losses
and lack of funds and market for adequate diversification contributed
to their difficulties.
In 1918, 26 state banks in all were chartered. Only one of these
had a capital of less than $25,000, the law lowering capital require-
ments having been effective in only the last month of this year. In 1919
the movement from private to state banks is clear. In this year 124
charters were granted, 23 in Chicago and 101 downstate. All but six
of the Chicago charters were for the minimum capital of $100,000.
Of the other 101 banks. 29 had capital of $25,000, 3 had capital be-
tween $15,000 and $25,000, 21 had capital exceeding $10,000 but not
exceeding $15,000, and 6 had capital of $10,000. Thus, 30 of the 101
had organized with less than $25,000 of capital stock.
The following year was the last during which private banks were
permitted to operate and the last in which they could take out state
or national charters. In the last month of this year the still lower
capital provisions became effective in the incorporated towns of 500 or
less population. In this calendar year, 1920, a total of 416 state charters
was granted. This number was approximately 30 per cent of the total
number of banks in operation at the end of 1920. All but 18 of these
banks were chartered outside Chicago. Thirteen of the 18 in Chicago
had minimum capital of $100,000. Twenty-eight downstate banks
chartered had $10,000 capital, 73 had capital in excess of $10,000 but
not exceeding $15,000, 17 had capital between $15,000 and $25,000, and
an additional 130 had $25,000 capital.
There was a marked decline in the new state charters for 1921,
after the effective date for abolishment of private banks; 50 were
issued, of which 22 were for Chicago banks. Fourteen banks in Chi-
cago organized with $100,000 capital. Ten banks outside Chicago
were of $15,000 capital or less.
In the three years from 1919 to 1921 inclusive, Illinois granted 590
charters, 63 to Chicago banks and 527 to banks outside Chicago. This
figure of 590 represented an unprecedented growth in state banks. On
January 1, 1919, there had been 854 state banks in operation. The new
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charters granted amounted to 69 per cent of the 854. Although a few
banks were removed by faikire, consohdation, and the like, during
this period, the number was relatively small.
On January 1, 1919, there had been 96 state banks in Chicago, so
that the 63 new charters were 66 per cent of the earlier total. Down-
state, the 527 new charters were 70 per cent of the 758 banks operating
at the beginning of the period.
A comparison of the banks taking out state charters during this
period that were the direct successors of private banks with all other
state banks operating at this time was made, in order to see what their
relative success was over a period of years. For this purpose all
private banks in Illinois that were listed in Polk's Bankers Encyclo-
pedia for September, 1918, were examined. A total of 524 private bank
offices were found, a few of which were branches of private banks. By
the time the prohibition of private banking became efifective in 1921,
a total of 79 of these were no longer in operation. Sixty-three of the
79 had discontinued business, 11 had consolidated with other banks,
and 5 had lost their identity by being absorbed into other banks.
This left 445 of the private banks which continued to function
under state and national charters. Only 12, however, took out national
charters. The remainder, 433, were incorporated under state charters.
At the end of 1921 there were 1,897 state and national banks oper-
ating in Illinois besides 2 in temporary suspension. By the end of
1935 only 723 of these were left; the remainder of 1.176, or 61.9 per
cent, had gone out of business. Of the 445 former private banks, 271,
or 60.9 per cent, were gone by the end of 1935. In this respect the
private banks did as well as all banks. Since only a few of the former
private banks took out national charters, it may be fairer to compare
them with state banks. Of the 1,400 state banks operating at the end
of 1921, 62.3 per cent were gone by the end of 1935. State banks that
had not recently been private banks lost almost 63 per cent of their
number between 1921 and 1935.
In each of these comparisons the former private banks seem to
have done as well or slightly better than the other banks. The com-
parison is not clear-cut, but it does suggest that those banks that took
out charters incidental to the private bank act were as well managed
and had a survival power equal to that of the other chartered banks,
most of which did not directly have their roots in former private banks.
The foregoing comparisons were made on the basis of banks gone
for any reason, whether failure, consolidation, suspension, absorption,
or liquidation. It is believed that more detailed examinations of these
factors would not greatly change the inferences. In these former
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private banks certain elements were present that are frequently lacking
among many of the incorporated banks. One is the factor of family
name and prestige. Many of the private banks were owned by old,
established families. Even after incorporation, family responsibility
and independence asserted themselves. No doubt, too, certain valuable
lessons of experience had been learned by these old bankers. Incor-
poration and supervision probably gave these banks a higher stability
than they might otherwise have attained.
These comparisons suggest that the banking difficulties of later
years were more fundamental than the question of weaknesses intro-
duced by private banks with small capital. No doubt these did add an
element of weakness, but it was only one factor among many and
should not be singled out for undue criticism.
Minimum capital requirements for new state banks were exceed-
ingly low from November 30, 1918, to November 1, 1924, particularly
in the period from December 1, 1920, to November 1, 1924. These
were the periods in which most private banks took out state charters.
But there were also a number of entirely new banks organized at this
time that took advantage of the exceedingly low capital requirements.
As will be pointed out in later pages, new banks apparently are less
stable than old, hence these might have introduced an unstable quality
because of both their size and their newness.
The banks chartered between November 30, 1918, and November
30, 1924, were classified into those incorporated prior to December 1,
1920, and those on or after that date. In the first of these two periods
284 new state banks were organized, 66 of these with less than $25,000
capital, of which 50 were formerly private bankers and 16 newly
organized concerns. Twenty-eight of the private bankers, or 56 per
cent, chose the minimum capital permitted when they incorporated ;
eleven of the newly organized concerns, or 69 per cent, had the mini-
mum capital. Only 8 of the 66 banks had over $15,000 capital, and
none had over $20,000.
In the second part of the period, when capital requirements were
even more liberal, 260 state banks were chartered; 102 of these had
less than $25,000 capital. Although the minimum capital remained at
$10,000, it became possible to organize a bank of this size in incor-
porated places with as little population as 500 or less. Of the 102
banks, 84 were traced to former private banks, and 18 were evidently
new bank outlets. Only 40 of the total, or approximately 40 per cent,
incorporated at the minimum capital for the town in which they oper-
ated. Six of these were new banks and 34 were former private banks.
Thus about 40.5 per cent of the private bankers incorporated with
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minimum capital as compared with 60 per cent in the earher period,
even though requirements were somewhat lower in this later period.
Though relatively fewer were chartered with the minimum, most
of them were nevertheless very small. Of the 62 chartered with
more tlian the required minimum capital, only 17 had more than
$15,000 of capital stock. In this respect there was no significant varia-
tion between newly organized banks and the successors of private
banks. Fifteen of the 17 banks whose capital stock exceeded $15,000
employed $20,000, and one employed $24,000.
III. BANKING TURNOVER IN ILLINOIS, 1921 TO 1935
Because of the prestige which for years has been associated with
financial institutions, they have been looked upon as far more stable
than they are as a matter of fact. It is not uncommon to see studies
of the turnover and mortality of retail and other types of establish-
ments. The same approach and point of view are here applied to the
banks of Illinois. In this manner a fairly adequate picture may be ob-
tained of banking stability or instability.
A summary of the banks in operation in Illinois in the past fifteen
years is contained in Table I. For state and national banks combined
the picture shown is one of declining numbers. From 1,897 in opera-
tion in 1921, the number rose to a peak of 1,912 in operation in 1922,
after which there was an uninterrupted decline to 875 in 1933, and a
slight increase since then to 890 in 1935. This was a shrinkage of 53.1
per cent in the number from 1921 to 1935. The trends for the changes
in numbers of state banks and national banks are similar, except that
the losses of the former were more severe. The percentage change
from 1921 to 1935 was a decline of 57.8 per cent for state banks as
compared with 39.8 per cent for national banks.
These figures give no clue to the actual number of banks which
were in operation within this entire period. Actually there were 2,278
dififerent banks in operation at some time in these fourteen years. If
this total number is used as the basis of comparison, then the actual loss
in number of banks in the period becomes 60.9 per cent. For state
banks the number of dift'erent banks was 1,637, and the revised per-
centage of loss is 63.9. The revised total of national banks is 641 and
the percentage of loss, 53.4. These figures include as losses banks
which failed, consolidated, converted from state to national, or vice
versa. They do not in every case represent the loss of a bank, but they
do indicate the exceptionally rapid rate of turnover of banks, usually
regarded as stable. Since the number of transfers from one system to
the other was small, the losses in bank numbers are attributable pri-
marily to the other factors mentioned. The problems opened by this
paragraph will be pursued in greater detail in later pages.
Some other interesting information is to be found in Table I. In
Cook county the number of banks continued to increase while the
number of downstate banks steadily declined. There was a steady
increase in the banks in Cook county from 261 in 1921 to 337 in 1928.
The same trend is found for both state and national banks, although
national banks reached their peak one year later. The entire number
of banks in Cook county increased by 29.1 per cent from 1921 to 1928;
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Table I
Number of State and National Banks Operating in Illinois, Cook County,
AND Downstate, 1921 TO 1935
(Data as of December 31 of each year or for the last call as reported in Individual
Statements of National Banks)
Year
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Table II
Percentage Declines in Number of Illinois Banks, 1921 to 1935
Classification
18 Bulletin No. 55
Table III
Per Capita Deposits of State and National Banks in Illinois, Downstate
Counties, Cook County, and Chicago, 1921 to 1935
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$119 in 1933. The recovery in 1934 and 1935 brought the figure back
to $180.
Cook county exclusive of Chicago reflects a peculiar trend. It
shows a much wider range of fluctuation. Here the growth was from
$205 in 1921 to $310 in 1928. The following slump was very severe,
and only a minor recovery has occurred since. Each year after 1928
deposits per person declined, from $310 in 1928 to $71 in 1932. By
1935 the figure was $141, only 45.5 per cent of the peak figure. If
the 1921 figure is taken as a base, then the peak figure of 1928 was
51.2 per cent above, the low of 1932 was 65.4 per cent below, and the
figure for 1935 was 31.2 per cent below the base.
Chicago maintained a better per capita figure than either the re-
mainder of Cook count}^ or all the other counties. Its 1935 figure was
24.0 per cent above that for 1921. Part of this showing may be due
to the corporation and outlying bankers' balances on deposit in Chi-
cago. It is quite evident, however, that the banks as a whole had lost
a large element of deposits which they formerly carried.
There are a number of factors which account for these variations in
per capita deposits. Besides the more obvious changes due to varia-
tions in price levels, population, and the like, there are more funda-
mental economic movements that have influenced banking and banking
deposits. Among the latter one may mention banking failures with
their influence upon confidence in solvent institutions, postal savings,
and the depression influence upon the incomes and savings of the
people.
Changes in price level have a definite efifect upon deposits, particu-
larly since a large part of the deposits represent business balances.
Changes in volume of business and in price levels are reflected either
in increasing or in decreasing deposits. Changes in employment, with-
drawal of savings for consumption, and changes in wages largely
influence savings deposits. As important as any of these factors is the
opportunity provided by postal savings as a haven for scared money.
In some communities such postal deposits exceed bank deposits. Then,
too, certain communities which formerly had banks are now without
such facilities. Part of the money formerly deposited in banks finds
its way into the banks of neighboring towns, some into postal savings,
and some is held on hand.
Perhaps a more direct analysis ma}^ be made by an examination
of deposits in terms of banks rather than population. This has been
done in Table IV, the first three columns of which give the average
deposits for all state banks in Illinois, all national banks, and both
combined.
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Table IV
Average Deposits per Bank for Illinois, Chicago, and Illinois Exclusive of
Chicago, 1921 to 1935
(000 omitted)
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Their averages are also influenced by changes in the numbers of
banks, but these changes were less severe and radical than in Chicago.
Nevertheless, the changing deposit figures are due to a decrease in
total banks, and in recent years to business recovery and government
policy. Quite clearly, even in the years prior to 1930, the average
deposits per bank did not show a healthy growth, if recognition is
given to the reduction in the number of banks among which to divide
the total deposits.
The national banks ranged from two to three times the size of the
state banks in their average deposits. Not only were the deposits of
state banks smaller, but their fluctuations by way of losses were more
severe. The average of $369,000 for 1933 was below the 1921 figure
of $386,000. Two years later, however, the average deposits had
jumped to $584,000, which practically equalled the peak in 1928.
National banks varied from $822,000 in 1921, to a high of $1,192,000
in 1928. The decline which set in reduced deposits to $940,000 in 1932,
which was still above the 1921 figure. This low point occurred one
year earlier than for state banks, and the recovery which followed
started earlier. In both 1934 and 1935, average deposits of national
banks established new peaks.
These figures have dealt in averages. Just as there are many banks
above these averages, so too there are many smaller banks. It is these
smaller banks that are faced with the greatest problems. These are
not new problems ; they are the same as those which have proved
themselves deterrents to profitable and successful small-bank operation
in other years.
To list only a few, one may mention the small amount of earnings
available to pay reasonable expenses and yield a fair return on the
capital funds invested, without accepting poor quality loans or making
hazardous investments.
Besides, there is the ever present danger that a loan or a few loans
or investments may prove bad, and the small capital funds thus be
impaired. Lack of sufficient high-grade loans, as well as inadequate
diversification, is another reason for the relatively greater difficulties
of successful operation of small as compared with large banks.
The automobile, by providing rapid transportation, has made it
easy for the small-town business man to keep accounts in the larger
centers. Chain stores have reduced the needs for local business loans.
The continued decline of many small towns has reduced their popula-
tion and at the same time decreased both the local activity and needs
for business loans.
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New kinds of competition have also develpped from the many types
of federal activities. Efforts of the federal government to provide
loans at very low rates to farmers for short and long term needs, home
mortgage purchases, and the like, have in one way or another been
reflected in reductions of bank activities and earnings. In some respects
these activities have helped banks out of difficulties ; in others they
have multiplied bank problems. Incessant pressure for lower interest
rates, not only on loans to farmers, home owners, and others, but in
the large money markets, with its reduction of yields on investment
securities, has made it increasingly difficult for many banks, particu-
larly the smaller institutions, to show a satisfactory volume of business
or to earn a reasonable return on their capital.
A condensed summary of what happened to banks in Illinois from
1922 to 1935 inclusive, is found in Table V. The data in this table
are in terms of numbers of banks. The first section of the table is for
state and national banks combined. This is followed by separate
summaries for state banks and for national banks.
Section A of the table shows the total number of banks operating
in Illinois, at the last call in 1921, classified according to Chicago, the
remainder of Cook county, and the downstate counties. All additions
to these banks within the fourteen years are summarized. This infor-
mation is followed by items showing the disposition of the banks in
this same period of time.
In the fourteen-year period 379 banks were chartered and started
operations. Only 362 of these were additions to the number of banks,
since the other 17 represented new charters issued to former state and
national banks which transferred from one system to the other. The
entire number of banks operating in the period was 2,278. These con-
sisted of 1,839 downstate banks, of which 201 were added subsequent
to 1921; 318 Chicago banks, of which 136 w^ere additions; and the
remainder of 121 in Cook county, of which 42 were added. In Cook
county and in Chicago the number of new banks chartered was rela-
tively greater in comparison with the number formerly operating than
in the downstate counties. In part this greater increase may have been
justified by the rapid growth of the metropolitan area of Chicago.
From these totals of banks there are deducted the losses in bank
numbers. Consolidations of one bank with another reduced the number
of banks by 119, of which 51 were in Chicago, 8 in the remainder of
Cook county, and 60 downstate. A somewhat smaller number of bank
losses was attributable to absorption of one bank by another or to the
assumption of debts and assets of one bank by another. There were
85 of these cases, 71 in downstate counties and 14 in Chicago. Besides
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Table V
Summary of Turnover of Illinois Banks, 1922 to 1935
Item Downstate
Cook
County
Outside
Chicago
Chicago
A. Total State and National Banks in Illinois
Total banks operating, end of 1921 . .
Additions to banks:
Restored in 1922
New banks chartered
Conversions from national or state.
Total additions
Total operating, organized, etc
Losses:
Consolidated with national or state
Absorbed by national or state
Converted to national or state
Total consolidations, absorptions, & conversions
Receivership
Liquidation
Suspension
Conservatorship
Total defunct
Total losses (consolidations, absorptions, defunct) . .
Net number operating, end of 1935
Suspended and restored
1,897
2
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there were 17 conversions from one system to another. Total losses in
bank facilities by consolidations, absorptions, and conversions were
thus 221, or 9.7 per cent. This indicates the small extent to which
declines in bank outlets were due to orderh^ combining of bank assets
and facilities.
By far the greater portion of changes in the number of banks was
due to forced or involuntary reductions. These included receiverships,
suspensions, conservatorships, and liquidations. Even these do not tell
the complete story, since many of the 221 absorptions and consolida-
tions no doubt had as their motive the assistance of one bank by
another.
By the end of 1935 there were 1,167 defunct banks other than
those lost by absorptions, consolidations, and conversions. These 1,167
were just about half (51.2 per cent) of the 2,278 banks which operated
within the period. For the 101 downstate counties, the 908 defunct
banks were slightly less than half of the total banks. In Chicago the
191 defunct banks were three-fifths of the total. And in the remainder
of Cook county the defunct banks constituted more than half of all
banks in operation in the period from 1922 to 1935 inclusive.
Of this total of 1,167 defunct banks, the largest group was ac-
counted for by the 637 in receivership. The next largest group was
those in liquidation, namely, 417.° The remaining two groups were
small, 74 in suspension and 39 in conservatorship. Most of these were
in the downstate counties.
Chicago accounted for nearly one-third of all bank consolidations
in Illinois
;
it also contributed about one-sixth of losses from defunct
banks. The same idea may be made clearer by comparing bank losses
from voluntary and involuntary causes with the total number of banks.
For the entire state, as has been mentioned, consolidations and absorp-
tions equalled 9.7 per cent of the total banks. Defunct banks accounted
for 51.2 per cent of the total. In the downstate counties consolidations
and absorptions accounted for 7.6 per cent of the total banks as com-
pared with 49.4 per cent defunct. Cook county, exclusive of Chicago,
had percentages of 8.3 and 56.2, respectively. In contrast to these fig-
ures, consolidations, conversions, and absorptions in Chicago amounted
to 22.6 per cent of the total banks. This figure was almost three times
as high as in the remainder of the state. It suggests the dynamic
character of banking in Chicago, as well as the opportunities for com-
bining banking facilities in a large city. Defunct banks in Chicago
"This group contains a few banks that liquidated vokintarily without loss
to depositors, but their number is too small to impair the general situation
reflected by the data.
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amounted to 60.1 per cent of total banks, a moderately higher figure
than for the remainder of IlUnois.
If the percentages of bank losses from all reasons are combined,
they amount to 60.9, 56.9, 64.5 and 82.7 per cent for the entire state,
for the 101 counties, for Cook county, and for Chicago, respectively.
Because of absorptions and consohdations, Chicago differs materially
from the others. Subtracting these percentages from 100 gives the
percentage of banks operating at the end of 1935. The actual numbers
operating are given at the bottom of Section A. For the entire state
the number was 890.
Even these figures give only a partial indication of bank changes.
In addition to the gains and losses in bank numbers listed in the table,
there were 51 banks which at some time after 1921 and before the end
of 1935 had been suspended and then restored to good standing. For
all practical purposes these 51 banks should be added to the 1,167 and
the 1,388 to get the full measure of bank instability in these years.
Practically all of these banks that were suspended and restored were
in downstate counties.
Section B of Table V contains data of a similar order for state
banks alone. It shows more clearly the gains from and losses to na-
tional banks. The total of 1,402 state banks operating at the beginning
of 1922 was divided into 155 in Chicago, 66 in the remainder of Cook
county, and 1,181 in downstate counties.
To these there were added 235 banks from 1922 to 1935 inclusive.
One of these represented a conversion of a national to a state bank; the
rest were newly chartered. Although these additions constituted less
than 9 per cent of the number initially operating in the downstate
counties, they approximated 50 per cent of the Cook county banks, and
66 per cent of the Chicago banks.
Losses in bank numbers have been divided into two groups. The
first represents those cases in which the bank going out of business
was either taken over by another or changed in form. These represent
for the most part, mild, orderly, and voluntary bank changes, with little
likelihood of losses to depositors. In fact, in most cases they are
healthy changes and helpful to the banking structure.
Consolidations of one state bank with another removed 85 banks
from the total. Consolidations of a state with a national bank removed
another 20 units from independent status. Sixteen state banks con-
verted to national banks. In all, 124 state banks were lost in these
ways. These losses represented approximately 5 per cent of the down-
state banks, 20 per cent of the Chicago banks, and 10 per cent of the
banks in the remainder of Cook countv.
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Involuntary losses, due to receivership, liquidations, suspensions,
and conservatorships, accounted for 922 banks that went out of the
state system. This constituted 56.3 per cent of the total operating in
the period. The percentages of defunct banks were 54.3 for down-
state counties, 58.2 for Cook county exclusive of Chicago, and 65.8 for
Chicago.
In addition to these changes in banks, 46 banks were suspended and
then restored to good standing within the years 1922 to 1935. Practic-
ally all of these were in downstate counties.
In Section C of Table V the national bank data are summarized.
At the end of 1921 there were 497 national banks in Illinois, 27 of
which were in Chicago. A total of 144 national banks were added in
the next 14 years, 16 of these banks representing conversions from
state to national charters, and hence no change in total facilities. For
the downstate counties the 100 additional banks amounted to more than
20 per cent of the 1921 number. In the case of Chicago banks, the 34
new charters exceeded the original number of 27. Even if the 7 state
banks which converted to nationals are omitted, the charters issued
to new national banks in Chicago between 1922 and 1935 equalled 100
per cent of the number operating at the end of 1921.
Losses of national banks in terms of numbers amounted to 342,
made up of 97 consolidations, conversions, and absorptions and 245
defunct banks. This is in the ratio of about 2 voluntary bank changes
to 5 banks in receivership, liquidation, suspension, or conservatorship.
For the state banks the ratio was less than 1 to 7. Downstate national
banks had about one voluntary loss to each 3 involuntary losses. In
Chicago national bank consolidations and absorptions approached in
number the losses through defunct banks. Cook county, excluding
Chicago, had only one voluntary loss.
As a rule, the ratio of voluntary bank losses to involuntary losses
was greater for the national banks and for the Chicago banks. A
partial explanation is to be found in the fact that relatively more of the
national banks operate in the cities, thereby affording greater oppor-
tunity for bank consolidations of a purely voluntary type, as well as
making possible the assumption of assets and deposits of weak banks
by the stronger. Chicago, both because of the dynamic character of its
banking, and because of the opportunities for some banks to lend
assistance to others, reported relatively more consolidations and absorp-
tions for both state and national banks than the rest of Illinois.
Another series of facts evidencing the instability of banking in
Illinois is contained in the data for Table VI and those immediately
following. These tables present figures of a similar type, but for differ-
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Table VI
Number of Banks Operating in Illinois at the End of 1921, New Banks
Subsequently Organized, and the Number of Each
Open and Closed, 1922 to 1935
(Data are for December 31 of each year or last call as reported in Individual
Statements of National Banks)
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Table VII
Turnover of New and Old Banks in Illinois, 1922 to 1935: Percentage of
Banks Gone by the End of Each Year to Number of Banks in
Operation at the Beginning of the Year
Year
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of banks gone were greater for the new than for the old banks. Fur-
thermore, the percentage gone was much larger for new banks than for
old banks in the nine years, whereas there were only slight differences
in the percentages in those five years when new banks gone were
relatively less than old banks.
in 1924, for example, the old banks gone by the year end were
only 2.1 per cent as compared with 5.8 per cent for the new banks. In
1929 the percentages were 3.9 and 7 .7 for old and new banks. In 1932
they were 16.3 and 29.4 for old and new banks, respectively. And in
1934 the percentages were 1.1 and 4.0.
Another way of showing this greater turnover among the new banks
is to compare the total number of years that the banks could have
operated had they remained in operation in the entire period studied,
or from their organization if chartered after 1921, with the total years
they actually functioned. On this basis the old banks operated 73.6
per cent of the possible total years contrasted with 64.6 per cent for
banks chartered subsequent to 1921. Clearly, on any basis, the turn-
over among new banks was more rapid and the risks of new ventures
greater.
The combined figures which are given in the last three columns of
Table VI show that there were 2,278 banks operating at some time
during the years 1922 to 1935, that 890 were still operating at the end
of 1935, and that the difference of 1,388, or 60.9 per cent, were gone
by the end of 1935. The percentages of banks gone to banks operating
range from a minimum of 0.9 per cent in 1922 to a maximum of 21.7
per cent in 1933. In 1935, 2 per cent of the banks were gone by the
year end.
The four tables which follow present the same data reclassified to
disclose variations in bank turnover in state and national banks, and in
Chicago banks and those outside Chicago. The record of new and old
state banks in Illinois is contained in Table VIII.
There were 1,402 state banks operating early in 1922. By the end
of 1928 more than one out of each six, or 229, were closed. With
numerous bank failures in following years, the number of banks gone
by the end of 1935 was 874, or 62.3 per cent of the original number.
For a time new banks were organized almost as fast as the old went
out of business. By the end of 1928, 170 new charters had been issued,
or somewhat less than the 229 lost among the older banks. Since 1930
very few new state banks have been chartered. The numbers of state
banks operating, however, both old and new, have continued to decline.
No doubt, an important factor in this record is to be found in the
relatively greater attractiveness of national than of state bank charters.
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Table VIII
Number of State Banks Operationg in Illinois at the End of 1921, New
Banks Subsequently Organized, and the Number of Each
Open and Closed, 1922 to 1935
(Data as of December 31 of each year)
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Table IX
Number of National Banks Operating in Illinois at the End of 1921, New
Banks Subsequently Organized, and the Number of Each
Open and Closed, 1922 to 1935
(Data as of December 31 or last call as reported in Individual Statements of
National Banks)
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New national banks organized subsequent to 1921 practically
equalled the losses in numbers of the old, this situation continuing
until 1928 and 1929. Beginning with 1933 the new charters granted
to national banks increased rapidly, the number more than doubling
from the 70 issued from 1922 to 1932 to 144 by the end of 1935. This
was in sharp contrast to the new state charters, which increased by
only one, from 234 at the end of 1932, to 235 at the end of 1935.
As already suggested, the old national banks showed a turnover
almost as great as that of the old state banks. What is the situation
with regard to the new banks, all but one of which have taken out
national charters? Will this increase of national bank charters mean
greater stability?
Attention is again directed to the fourth to sixth columns of Table
IX, which disclose changes in newly chartered national banks. Al-
though new national charters issued after 1929 did not keep pace
with the losses in the years following, they increased at a very rapid
rate because of the relatively more attractive charters offered. By the
end of 1935, 144 new charters had been granted, and 40 of these banks,
or 27.8 per cent, were gone. This is a very much lower figure than
the 73.2 per cent for new state banks. Such a comparison, however, is
very unfair to the state banks. As has been pointed out, most of the
new national charters were granted from 1933 to 1935. These new
nationals have not had an opportunity to show their mettle, nor did
they operate under the trying conditions of the preceding years.
It is necessary to turn to some other measure of bank turnover to
obtain a reasonably fair comparison between new state and new na-
tional banks. One such measure is the comparison of banks gone at the
end of each year with the number operating at the beginning of each
year. In this respect the new national banks had a lower rate of turn-
over than the state banks, but not a significantly better showing nor
one which indicates a high degree of stability.
Prior to 1929 the percentages of banks gone in each year were not
very large for either type of bank; the national banks, however, held
a modest margin over the state banks. In 1929, new national banks
gone at the year end amounted to 2.5 per cent of their number as com-
pared with 9.0 per cent for state banks. In the years 1930 to 1934
inclusive, the percentages for state banks were 19.8, 30.6, 29.4, 27.8,
and 6.1, respectively. For national banks the figures for the same years
were 13.3, 19.1, 29.3, 22.5, and 1.7 per cent. Here again the national
banks reflect a greater stability than the state banks, but their advan-
tage is not very large. New national banks have been only moderately
more stable than new state banks.
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Table X
Number of State and National Banks Operating in Illinois (Exclusive of
Chicago) at the End of 1921, New Banks Subsequently Organized,
AND the Number of Each Open and Closed, 1922 to 1935
(Data as of December 31 or last call as reported in Individual
Statements of National Banks)
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Table XI
Number of State and National Banks Oper.\ting in Chicago at the End of
1921, New Banks Subsequently Organized, and the Number of
Each Open and Closed, 1922 to 1935
(Data as of December 31 or last call as reported in Individual
Statements of National Banks)
Banking Turnover and Facilities in Illinois 35
the old. The percentage of old banks gone by the end of 1935 was
86.3 as compared with 77.9 per cent for the new.
If the years of operation are compared with the years in which
the banks might have operated, the old banks in Chicago are found to
have functioned 60.0 per cent of the possible maximum ; the corre-
sponding figure for new banks is 58.1 per cent.
The extraordinarily large number of new banks organized in Chi-
cago is suggested by the fact that the number of 136 at the end of
1935 equalled more than three-fourths of the number operating at the
end of 1921. Although one would naturally expect more changes in a
large metropolitan area in the way of consolidations, mergers, absorp-
tions, and the like, the exceedingly rapid changes could only indicate a
condition of undesirable instability in the long run. The mere fact that
banks were consolidating or otherwise reducing their number is not
so much open to criticism as is the continual succession of new banks,
which suggests speculative promotions.
Percentages of banks gone at the end of each 3^ear again suggest
the less stable position of the new banks. Although new banks held an
advantage prior to 1929, this was more than lost in the following years.
From 1922 to 1928 the percentage of new banks gone did not exceed
5.3 in any year. In fact, in four years there were no losses, and in two
additional years the losses were less than 2 per cent of the number
operating at the beginning of each year. Old banks reported some
banks gone in each year, the figures ranging from 0.6 per cent to 6.7
per cent.
Beginning with 1929, however, the situation was reversed, and the
percentages of banks gone were magnified. The percentages of old
banks gone were 6.9 in 1929, 13.4 in 1930, 41.4 in 1931, 44.1 in 1932,
28.9 in 1933, none in 1934, and 10.7 in 1935. For the new banks the
corresponding percentages were 13.8, 15.6, 42.0, 45.5, 35.3, 11.1, and
none in 1935.
From the foregoing paragraphs certain tentative conclusions may
be drawn. First among these is the pronounced turnover of banks in
all categories. The rate of turnover in old banks, however, was con-
sistently exceeded by that for new banks, suggesting the inherent risks
and greater speculative aspects of many new ventures. This is not
unlike conditions which ordinarily prevail in merchandising and manu-
facturing establishments.''
*Paul D. Converse, Business Mortality of Illinois Retail Stores from 1925 to
1920, Bulletin No. 41, Bureau o£ Business Research, University of Illinois,
Urbana, 1932.
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In appraising these conditions for old banks, i.e., those operating
at the end of 1921, the great influx of corporate banks in the years
just prior to this period, due to the prohibition against private banks,
should not be overlooked. No doubt these former private banks and
the many other small banks chartered in the years 1918 to 1924 pre-
vented the "old" banks from making a better showing than they did.
A second important factor was the rapid and continued issuance
of charters to new banks in the face of marked instability among both
new and old banks. Charters were granted for both state and national
banks, for Chicago and downstate banks. But the most liberal issuance
of permits for new banks was found in Chicago, which had a less
stable condition than the remainder of the state.
Banks in Illinois outside Chicago show a more favorable picture in
several ways. Their turnover was less rapid, both for old and new
banks. Furthermore the new charters issued were a smaller percentage
of the downstate banks.
As between state banks and national banks, the latter seemed to
be more stable. Nevertheless the margin in favor of the national banks
was not large. Both types of banks showed an exceedingly high turn-
over, and both had a very large number of new additions to their ranks.
In fact, relatively more new national banks than state banks were
chartered.
The preceding tables have shown a very marked decline in numbers
operating for the year 1933, which included the so-called Bank Holi-
day. All banks in Illinois were closed by proclamation of the Governor
on March 4, 1933, two days before the national Bank Holiday. Subse-
quent to these involuntary closings, banks were permitted to reopen
only if they were known to be solvent, or if they made the necessary
readjustments in their capital structures to place them in sound
condition.
One might assume that the reopening of banks under such condi-
tions would disclose the relative condition of the various units, and
that those that opened later would be the weaker. Numerous elements
operated to weaken such inferences. In opening the banks, definite
precedence was given to those in the Reserve Cities, then permission
was granted to banks with clearing associations, and later to the small
country banks. Furthermore, the tremendous pressure under which
the reopenings functioned must have precluded the most satisfactory
appraisal of each bank. The strict standards that were set for the
reopening of banks, particularly in the case of national banks, aroused
bankers and business men and resulted in political pressure for their
relaxation. Although such limitations as the above vitiate an exact
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comparison of banks reopened subsequent to the moratorium, they do
not destroy much of the value of such an analysis.
A chronological record of bank reopenings subsequent to the mora-
torium is summarized in Table XII. On March 3, 1933, there were
1,026 banks operating in Illinois, of which 326 were in the national
system and 700 in the state system.
From March 13, when the first reopenings were authorized, up to
the end of 1935, a total of 876 of these banks were reopened and the
remainder of 150 were not permitted to reopen. Of course, in between
these two dates many of the 876 banks that reopened had made im-
portant necessary additions and readjustments in their capital and
reorganized their assets. But recognizing this, the fact remains that by
the end of 1935, 14.6 per cent had not been granted permission to
operate; conversely, 85.4 per cent had been opened.
There was considerable variation, however, in the percentages of
state and national banks which opened immediately and ultimately. By
the end of 1935 the percentage of national banks which had reopened
was 73.3 per cent. All 12 of the Chicago national banks opened in the
first week. State banks were relatively slower in reopening, partly
because of the larger number in downstate areas. By the end of 1935,
however, a much larger percentage of state banks had reopened,
namely, 91.0 per cent. Although all Chicago national banks reopened
in the first week, only 56.1 per cent of Chicago state banks reopened so
quickly, and 26.3 per cent had not opened by the end of 1935. In the
remainder of Cook county and downstate a much larger percentage of
state banks ultimately reopened, although less quickly than did national
banks.
Another element which must be considered in this connection was
that a relatively larger percentage of national banks were in the larger
towns and cities (see Table XVII). This would warrant the expecta-
tion that national banks would open more rapidly than state banks, as
was actually the case.
But the relatively greater frequency with which state banks had
opened than national by the end of 1935 suggests markedly different
policies. Either a larger percentage of national than of state banks did
not wish to reorganize, or were not permitted to do so. The logical
inference is that the standards for national bank reopenings were
higher. This point is borne out by the analysis of what happened to
these reopened banks. Before taking up this analysis, however, a few
more comments are in order regarding the rate of bank reopenings.
In the six weeks from March 20 to April 30, 46.3 per cent of state
banks reopened, as contrasted with 7.4 per cent for national banks.
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Only 5.3 per cent of Chicago state banks reopened in this period and
none of the national, since they had all been opened previously. In
Cook county (excluding Chicago) 25.0 per cent of the state banks
reopened in these six weeks, but only 9.1 per cent of the national
banks. And for downstate counties 51.6 per cent and 7.6 per cent of
state and national banks, respectively, reopened in this period. During
the few months from May to December, 1933, inclusive, state bank
reopenings continued in substantial volume, but national banks were
relatively fewer.
In general a smaller proportion of national banks (except in
Chicago) than of state banks reopened; but they opened in a much
shorter interval of time. Furthermore, of the reopened banks, rela-
tively more of the national banks remained open than of the state.
Of the 200 national banks shown in Table XII as having opened in
the first week following the moratorium, all but seven were operating
at the end of 1935. The disposition of these seven, which were all
downstate, was as follows: 1 was absorbed by a state bank, 3 were
absorbed by national banks, and 3 were liquidated. The following week
12 more national banks were authorized to open, of which 11 were
still operating at the end of 1935. In the week of March 27 to April 2,
1933, a total of eight national banks reopened ; seven of these were
operating at the end of 1935. All together, of the 239 national banks
reopened subsequent to the moratorium, 227 were still active at the
end of 1935. These 227 represented 95.0 per cent of the 239.
For the state banks the record of subsequent survival was some-
what less favorable. Of the 700 state banks operating just prior to the
moratorium, 637 had been authorized to reopen by the end of 1935,
but only 577 of these were in operation at the end of 1935. Thus only
90.6 per cent of the 637 were operating.
In another respect the record of the state banks differs from that
of the national banks. Those state banks that reopened in the first three
weeks were less successful than the corresponding national banks.
Although 95.9 per cent of the national banks that reopened in this
period remained open by the end of 1935, only 88.0 per cent of the
state banks were still functioning.
In another way the policies and operations of state and national
banking departments may be contrasted. Of the 200 national banks
reopened the first week of March 13 to 19 following the moratorium,
96.5 per cent were operating at the end of 1935. Of the total of 126
banks unopened in this week, only 34, or 27.0 per cent, were operating
on this latter date. Evidently a national bank that did not open the
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first week had a poor chance of reorganizing and reopening. It would
appear that records from which to determine whether national banks
should reopen were in effective condition.
As already mentioned, there were 171 state banks reopened in the
week of March 13 to 19, of which 146, or 85.4 per cent, were operating
at the end of 1935. Of the 529 remaining state banks, 466, or 88.1 per
cent, subsequently reopened. Even 14 out of 65 state banks that were
suspended as of March 3, 1933, reopened by the end of 1935. Thus the
state banks, although slower in reopening, had a much better chance
to reopen than the national. No doubt the number of state banks
involved, as well as differences in records and severity of reopening
standards, was a factor accounting for these variations.
IV. BANKING FACILITIES IN ILLINOIS TOWNS
In view of the severe losses in number of banks, both state and
national, which have occurred, it is evident that many communities
which formerly had banking facilities are no longer thus supplied by
convenient local enterprises. Many other communities formerly pro-
vided with more than one bank outlet are now being served by perhaps
one bank. Some of these changes, where they relieved over-banked
areas, must be regarded as beneficial from the long-run point of view.
Other communities, however, that are now without banking facilities
may find their business somewhat handicapped.
There is a very definite relationship between the size or popula-
tion of a community and the banking facilities which have been avail-
able to it. Table XIII, which accompanies this text, shows the total
number of towns of various sizes in Illinois for 1920 and 1930. In
comparison it gives the total number of towns of these sizes which had
banking facilities in 1921, 1930, and 1935. In listing the total towns,
all communities, both incorporated and unincorporated, were tabulated.
These data were taken from the census reports, but were supplemented
by Rand McNally's Commercial Atlas of America for 1922 and 1932,
for the many very small communities not listed by the census.
A total of 3,739 towns and villages was found for 1920, and 4,160
for 1930.
In 1921 there were 1,042 communities in Illinois which had banks.
By 1930 and 1935 the number had decreased to 939 and 655, respec-
tively. The latter figure reflects a loss of banking facilities by 387 com-
munities, or 37.1 per cent of those which had banks in 1921. There
were 25 other communities that had banks subsequent to 1921, 6 of
which were without facilities by 1930. In 1920 there were 1,362 com-
munities which were without recognized population; in 1930, 1,605
were in this class. No banks were found in any of the communities
without definite population figure in 1921, 1930, or 1935.^
The number of towns with banks in 1921 constituted 27.9 per cent
of the total towns in the state. In 1930 the percentage of towns with
banks had fallen to 22.6 per cent, and in 1935 the towns with banks
were only 15.7 per cent of the entire number reported in the 1930
census and the Directory.
In 1921, 14 communities with less than 100 population had banking
facilities. By 1930 the number had dropped to 11, and by 1935 to 8.
'The data for the banks are as of 1921 and are compared with the popula-
tion data as of 1920. Likewise, the banking data for both 1930 and 1935 are
compared with the population for 1930, the year of the latest census.
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Table XIII
Total Number of Illinois Towns, Classified According to Size, and
Percentage with Banking Facilities, 1921, 1930, and 1935
Population
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munities. If the number of towns with less than 500 population that
had banks are combined, the total is 438 in 1921, and 212 in 1935,
showing a loss of 51.6 per cent. This loss took place in the face of an
actual increase in the total number of towns of this size from 1,676
to 1,855 (omitting those without designated population).
These figures are in marked contrast to those for larger towns.
The towns with 500 to 5,000 population declined slightly in number,
from 609 in 1920, to 584 in 1930. Five hundred and twelve of these
had a bank in 1921, and 346 in 1935. This was a decline of 32.4 per
cent, or decidedly less of a shrinkage in facilities than was found for
the smaller communities. Thus the total towns in this group decreased
as compared with an increase of smaller towns, but the loss of banking
facilities was less than for the small towns.
A similar grouping of towns with populations of 5,000 or more
shows that there were 92 in 1921 and 116 in 1930. All 92 towns had
banks in 1920. Although not all of the 116 had banks in 1935, the
number of towns with banks was larger in 1935 at 97 than the figure of
92 in 1920. These figures suggest the greater ability of large towns
to support banks. The shrinkage in the percentages of towns with
banking facilities is less as the size of town increases.
The decrease in the number of towns with some banking facilities
was far less severe than the decline in the total number of banks.
Many towns which formerly had more than one bank lost some of
them, but this did not have such a blighting influence as a complete
loss of all banks.
The data in Table XIV compare the number of banks, both state
and national, with the number of towns which had banks, all classified
by population of the town. The number of towns with banks declined
from 1,042 in 1921 to 655 in 1935. In this same period the total num-
ber of banks declined from 1,897 to 890. The banks fell off more
rapidly, so that, in comparison with an average of 1.8 banks per town
in 1921, there were only 1.4 banks per town in 1935. These figures
omit towns without any banking facilities.
Among those towns of less than 400 persons which had banks, only
a few had more than one bank in 1921. None of this size had more
than one bank in 1935. Whereas in 1921 many towns with more than
400 population and up to 1,000 had more than one bank per town, by
1935 few towns of 1,000 or less population had more than one bank.
In 1921 there were 513 towns with less than 1,000 population which
had one bank, 158 towns with two banks, and 2 with three banks. By
1935 there were 346 with one bank, 18 with two banks, and none with
more than two.
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Table XIV
Number of Illinois Towns with Banks, Total Banks, and Banks per Town of
Various Sizes, 1921, 1930, 1935
Population
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Because of the dual movements in the number of banks on one
hand and the shifts in population on the other, some rather significant
changes have taken place in the population per bank. Although the
data presented in Table XV give no recognition to the rural popula-
tion, the results shown are sufficiently pronounced to justify rather
clear conclusions.
In this table the populations of those towns of various sizes which
had banks at the last date of call in each of the three years, 1921, 1930,
and 1935, are compared with the number of banks in these towns in
order to arrive at figures for population per bank. These data omit
the country population as well as the population of all communities
that had no bank at the end of each of the selected years.
^
From this table it is readily seen that the town and city population
per bank increases very markedly as the size of town increases. This
condition holds good for each of the three years examined in Table
XV. Even though the number of banks per town is larger in the
larger towns, the population per bank increases rapidly.
Perhaps more significant are the changes from year to year in each
of the size-groups of towns. In towns of the very smallest size no
appreciable change from 1921 to 1930 and to 1935 is evident. The
banks in towns of 300-399 population served an average of 315 per-
sons in 1921, and 350 in 1935. As the larger-sized towns are examined,
progressive increase in population per bank is noted for 1935 over
both 1921 and 1930. Thus the figure for banks in towns of 1,000 to
1,999 population was 45 per cent greater in 1935 than in 1921. Banks
in towns of 5,000 to 9,999 population had an average of 4,737 persons
per bank in 1935 compared with 2,667 in 1921, or an increase of
slightly over 75 per cent. Cities of 50,000 or more population (except
Chicago) showed a more than 100 per cent increase in population per
bank. In Chicago the increase per bank was more than three-fold.
These data suggest that not only have the banks in larger towns
and cities enjoyed a vastly larger potential number of customers than
the banks in smaller towns, but this comparative advantage has moved
sharply in a direction still more favorable to the banks in large towns
and cities.
Even though this table does not reflect country population and the
population of many small and a few large towns without banks, it is
evident that such data would not destroy its significance. Country
*The population figures were computed from the mid-points of the class
intervals rather than by tabulation of the individual town populations, thus
avoiding considerable tedious work. Although less exact than the tabulation, any
difference would have but a distinctly minor influence on the results of the table.
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people and persons in small towns without banks tend to turn more
to the towns of over 10,000 population for trading and banking facili-
ties. This implies that the small banks in small towns are not getting
the full impact of customers from other small towns which are now
without banks, many of whom now go to larger cities.
It would seem that in towns of less than 2,000 population, farm
customers are as likely to go to a bank in a town of 500 population as
to one in a town of 300 population. Since most of the towns of less
than 2,000 population have but one bank, there would be no division of
the business among two or more banks. Thus, in the small towns the
farm-trade factor would probably increase the figures shown in Table
X\' but would not change their relationships.
In the next table, number XVI, the towns have been grouped in
larger population intervals and the banks classified according to size
of town and number of banks in the town. Thus the number of banks
in towns with only one bank are shown separately, the banks in towns
where they had one direct competitor grouped together, and so forth.
In the lower half of the table percentages are presented which indi-
cate the change from 1921 to 1935 in the number of banks according to
size of town and the number of banks per town.
As previously pointed out, the 890 banks operating at the end of
1935 were 46.9 per cent of the 1.897 operating at the end of 1921. For
towns of less than 500 population, the 215 banks operating were 44.1
per cent of the 488 operating in 1921. By similar comparisons it is
found that the number of banks operating in 1935 relative to the
number in 1921 increases as size of town increases, with the exception
of Chicago, which had peculiar problems. Thus, although the 1935
banks were 44.1 per cent of the 1921 number in towns of less than
500, the percentage increased steadily to 56.9 per cent for towns of
10,000 or more population (exclusive of Chicago). From this show-
ing the conclusion must be drawn that the loss in number of banks was
less severe in the larger cities than in the smaller towns, again except-
ing Chicago, and that the loss of banking facilities was in inverse
relation to the size of city or town. In Chicago, the losses were severe ;
only 30.2 per cent of the number of banks operating in 1921 were
operating by 1935.
In the losses of banks in these years there was a shifting of many
towns from two-bank towns to one-bank towns, and likewise from
three-bank towns to two- and one-bank towns. Some of these shifts are
shown in the details of Table XVI. Since most of the small towns of
less than 500 population never had more than one bank, it was obvi-
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Table X\T
Illinois Baxks Classified According to Population and Number of
Banks in Towns, 1921, 1930, and 1935
Bank-Town Groups
Population of Towns
ToUl
Less
than
500
500-
1,999
2,000-
9,999
10.000
or more
(exclud-
ing
Chicago)
Chicago
A. Number of Banks, 1921, 1930,
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been so important as in the larger towns. Nevertheless, that it was of
some significance is indicated in the analysis of Table XVI. There
were 50 towns of less than 500 population in 1921 which had two
banks each, or a total of 100 banks. By 1935 only 3 towns had two
banks. ]\Iany of those formerly with two now appear among the 515
one-bank towns.
Larger towns—i.e., those with 500 or more population—actually
showed an increased percentage operating in 1935 over 1921 in the
one-bank category. This was primarily attributable to additions to
these groups and to losses of towns that formerly had more than one
bank. For example, in the 500 to 1,999 population group there were
420 banks in towns with two banks in 1921, and only 72 of these were
still in the two-bank town category by 1935. In this same group of
towns there were 30 banks in 10 three-bank towns in 1921, and none
in 1935.
The figures likewise show that whereas in 1921 all the towns of
10,000 population or more had more than one bank each, and only 3
towns had as few as two banks, by 1935 there were 11 with one bank
and 19 watli two banks. As contrasted with 203 banks in 40 towns
W'ith three or more banks each in 1921, there were only 70 banks in 18
towns with three or more banks in 1935.
The foregoing figures are based upon the total of state and national
banks; they do not indicate the extent to w^hich facilities are provided
by one or the other type of institution. Such a breakdown of the banks
is shown in Table XVII. The percentages for state and national banks
in this table are based upon the figures presented in Table XVI.
As might be expected, the losses in the number of national banks
were less severe than for state banks, so that the percentage of
national banks to the total increased from 26.2 in 1921, to 27.9 in 1930,
and 33.6 in 1935. A similar picture is found for towns wdth one bank,
two banks, and so forth. There is a marked trend for the percentage
of national to total banks to increase as the number of banks per tow-n
increases. Thus in 1935, national banks accounted for 24.7 per cent
of the banks in one-bank towns, 44.7 per cent in two-bank towns, and
64.7 per cent in three-bank towns. The exception was in towns with
four or more banks, in which national banks accounted for 38.8 per
cent of the total.
Without doubt these figures reflect the factor of size of town,
since the number of banks tends to increase as the size of town
increases. Thus they reflect in part the tendency of national banks to
be a more important factor in the larger towns. They also suggest the
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higher minimum capital requirements of national banks over state
banks in earlier years, which, because it was difficult for small com-
munities to support a fair-sized bank, frequenth- precluded them from
having national banks.
This point becomes clearer if the totals for the towns of various
size are examined. In towns of less than 500 population national banks
accounted for 10.2 per cent of the total in 1935. This increased to
29.6 per cent for towns of 500 to 1,999 population, 52.9 per cent for
towns of 2,000 to 9,999 population, and 49.6 per cent for towns of
10,000 or above, exclusive of Chicago. In Chicago, national banks
were 38.2 per cent of the total. With minor exceptions, each of the
percentages is larger than the comparable figures for 1921 and 1930.
National banks have held their own better than state banks in towns of
all sizes.
In each of the groups of one-bank towns by population size, the
national banks increased their percentage to the total banks from 1921
to 1935. A similar rise in the percentage of national to total banks is
found in the various sizes of towns with two banks. Except in the
towns with 500 to 1,999 population, in which the cases were few, a
similar tendency is again noted in the three-bank towns.
In the towns with four banks or more the same picture is found
for the total although not in those of 10,000 population or over (ex-
clusive of Chicago). Here state banks maintained their relative posi-
tion quite well. Although Chicago has a very low proportion of
national banks to total banks as compared with other towns in Illinois,
it showed a marked difference in this respect. Whereas there was about
one national bank for each six state banks in Chicago in 1921, by 1935
the ratio was one national to two state banks.
It is thus evident that over the period studied, in all sizes of towns
and irrespective of the number of bank outlets, national banks showed
a marked improvement in their number relative to the number of state
banks.
A still more detailed tabulation of the number of towns classified
according to their size and the number of banks in each is contained
in Table XVIII, which analyzes the changes in the period from
1930 to 1935.
Section A is concerned with towns which had one bank both in
1930 and 1935. All together there were 624 towns of all sizes that had
one bank each in 1930. By 1935 there were 515 towns with one bank
each. The intervening items explain the difiference. Of the 624 towns
in 1930, by 1935, 245, or 39.3 per cent, were without a bank and 2 had
two banks each. This left 377 of the original 624 still supplied with
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one bank. There were, however, 138 towns formerly in other categories
which by 1935 were added to these 377 to bring the total of one-bank
towns to 515. Six of the towns which had a bank in 1935 had been
unsupphed in 1930. The largest number of additions. 114. came from
towns which had formerly had two banks, but by 1935 had but one.
An additional 18 towns formerly had three or more banks, but only
one each by 1935.
The other columns in Table X\^III show the changes in one-bank
towns when grouped by population. The original 352 one-bank
towns of less than 500 population lost 44.3 per cent of their number by
1935. Furthermore, they gained only 13 towns from other categories.
Larger towns fared better. The percentage of their loss was less
and the gains from former over-banked towns were greater. Thus the
500 to 1,999 population towns started with 233 in 1930, lost 77, or 33
per cent, by 1935, and gained 63 other towns, 61 of which formerly
had two banks and one of which had three banks. Losses in banking
facilities to one-bank towns of the 2,000 to 9.999 population group
were less severe, and gains from former two and three-bank towns
relatively greater.
Section B provides a similar picture for those towns which had two
banks. All together there were 236 towns in this group in 1930. Forty-
three of these, or 18.2 per cent, were without any bank outlet by the
end of 1935. An additional 114 had lost one bank: they are the same
114 gained by the one-bank towns. Actually, however, a much smaller
percentage of these two-bank towns lost all banking facilities than did
the one-bank towns. An additional 34 towns, most of which formerly
had three banks, were added to this group. Only two towns which in
1930 had one bank were able to climb into the two-bank group.
Small towns ( less than 500 population) with two banks were few
in number in 1930. and gained no new towns by 1935. Only three out
of 21 still had two banks and an additional 10, one bank. Of the
towns in the 500 to 1,999 population group in 1930. only 35 out of
1 14 were able to maintain two banks. An additional 61 had one bank.
Since only two towns of this size had more than two banks in 1930,
and none in 1935, there were no significant additions to this group.
The towns with three or more banks are analyzed in Section C. Of
the 78 towns in this category in 1930, 26 still maintained three or more
banks by 1935. Fifty of the 7^ towns had just three banks in 1930;
only nine were able to support three banks by 1935. Two small towns
in the 500 to 1,999 population group still had one out of three and
two out of three banks by 1935.
Thirty-eight towns in the 2.000 to 9,999 population group started
Banking Turnover and Facilities in Illinois 53
out with three or more banks in 1930. By 1935 one had no bank, 11
had one bank, 18 had two banks, and only 8 had three or more banks.
Even in this latter group not all the banks had survived. Five towns
that in 1930 had four or more banks had less than four banks each
by 1935.
Ten of the 30 towns with populations of 10,000 to 49,999 in 1930
remained in the three or more-bank group in 1935. One town of this
size had no banks in 1935, 6 were served by one bank, and 13 by two
banks. The 8 largest cities (excluding Chicago) with populations of
50,000 or more, lost some of their banks, but each still had three or
more banks by 1935.
One of the weaknesses of the banking system in Illinois both in the
past and at present, is the small proportion of state banks which are
members of the Federal Reserve System. Although some of this
weakness may be offset to a small degree by operations of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, this agency does not provide a complete
remedy.
All national banks are members of the Federal Reserve System,
but only about one state bank out of ten is a member bank. There are
few member banks in small communities. Although the percentage of
state banks which are members has increased over the period of years,
this has been due rather to a decline in the total number of banks than
to an actual increase of state banks that are members.
In Table XIX the total number of state banks in Illinois is com-
pared with the number of state member banks for the various sizes of
town. The data in this table are for the years 1921, 1930, and 1935.
In 1921 only 6.2 per cent of these banks were members. Few banks
in small towns were members
; only two of the 447 in towns of less than
500 population were members in 1921. Nor was there any significant
change in this respect among these small banks in later years. Six out
of 193, or 3.1 per cent, were members in this same size of town in 1935.
As the size of bank and the size of town in which it is located
become larger, there is a tendency for relatively more of the banks to
be Federal Reserve members. Thus in the 500 to 1,999 population
towns, 17 banks, or 3.8 per cent, were members. By 1935 the percent-
age had increased to 7.?> per cent of the banks in these towns. In a
similar manner, the banks in towns of 2,000 to 9,999 population had
increased their percentage of membership from 8.4 in 1921 to 14.1
per cent in 1935. In the towns of 10,000 and more population (exclu-
sive of Chicago), 18 banks, or 14.4 per cent of the total, were members
in 1921, 13 banks or 10.8 per cent in 1930, and 12 banks or 20.0 per
cent in 1935.
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In Chicago the percentage of state member banks to total state
banks showed marked changes, due both to changes in the total number
of banks and in the number of member banks. In 1921 there were 155
state banks, of which 31, or 20.0 per cent, were members. Although the
number of state banks had increased to 167 by 1930, the member
banks declined to 14, which constituted 8.4 per cent of the state banks.
By 1935, member banks in Chicago had increased to 18 and total state
banks had dropped to 34, so that the percentage of the former to the
latter was 52.9.
The figures are for state banks alone. The percentages given in
this table do not completely reflect the extent to which both state and
national banks are members in the Reserve System and the extent (as
measured by number of banks) to which the Federal Reserve System
is able to influence banking policies. By reference to Table XVII, a
better portrayal of this situation may be obtained. That table showed
what percentages of the banks in various sizes of towns were national
and state banks. Thus, it was found that in 1935, 10.2 per cent of the
banks in towns of less than 500 population were national banks. Quite
clearly, the addition of national banks to the figures for state member
banks does not increase the percentage of member banks to total banks.
In the larger towns, however, the situation is different. In the 500 to
1,999 population group, national banks accounted for 29.6 per cent of
all banks in 1935. These national banks, together with the state bank
figures in Table XIX, raise the percentages shown there. Such a
combination of figures is still more favorable to the larger towns, in
which the proportion of national banks to total banks is larger.
The figures for member banks in the Federal Reserve System,
particularly the state banks which were shown in Table XIX, suggest
a high degree of instability. In the first place the percentages of state
banks in the small communities which are members are too small for a
healthy coordinated banking structure. Even recognizing all the vary-
ing disturbing elements in the banking structure, the fact remains that
the Federal Reserve System is unable to accomplish a satisfactory
coordinating function without a fuller participation of many small
banks.
The change in state bank members from 87 in 1921 to 51 in 1930
and to 65 in 1935 is indicative of this unstable condition. From the
high to the low this represents a variation of almost one-third. Par-
ticularly in the towns of 500 to 1,999 population have the variations in
state bank membership been erratic. Other sizes of town also showed
wide variations. The same situation was found in Chicago.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A thorough study of all aspects of banking in Illinois would develop
into several volumes. So broad a subject as banking, with all its
economic and financial ramifications, cannot be divorced from the many
related fields of enterprise, government policy, and institutions influ-
encing banking. Although this bulletin makes no pretence of being a
complete and exhaustive study, it does show in considerable detail what
has taken place over a period of years in the number of Illinois banks.
From this study of limited scope it is feasible to make certain infer-
ences which are undoubtedly valid.
The three main headings of the sections of the bulletin are sug-
gestive of the broad inferences which may be made. The first section
dealt with private banks, the conditions under which they entered the
incorporated banking system, and the related statutes for capital
requirements. The second section was concerned with banking turn-
over, instability, and consolidations, and with the chartering policies of
state and national banking departments. The third section examined
changes in banking facilities in various sizes of Illinois towns.
It is proposed now to relate these three sections and to find in them
suggestions for the avoidance of future difiiculties. There can be no
question that many factors besides those here mentioned should be
carefully weighed and considered, but the fact remains that these too
must be taken into account ; indeed, they have already been recognized
by many students, bankers, and legislators. The economic conditions
of recent years are one of the important factors accounting for bank
difficulties, but they merely aggravated rather than caused the trouble.
The act prohibiting private banks in Illinois after January 1, 1921,
and the acts reducing capital requirements for new banks from
November, 1918, to December, 1924, paved the way for a great influx
of small incorporated state banks. Approximately 600 state charters
were granted in this period, most of them to former private banks, and
most of them with capital of less than $25,000. Even among the new
banks which had not been private banks in 1918, capital was small.
Although this influx of new banks of small stature cannot be given
primary blame for later bank failures, it undoubtedly represented an
unwise granting of corporate powers. Even though those state banks
which had their roots in former private banks showed a survival power
almost as great as other banks operating prior to 1922, there can be
no doubt that the low capital requirements, which admitted small
banks, provided an element of instability in the entire banking
structure.
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Obviously a bank of $10,000 or even $20,000 capital is not inher-
ently different in size, management, policies, success, operations, profit-
ableness, and mortality from the common run of small retailing and
manufacturing establishments, which are usually individual or family
enterprises. Only in the respect that such small banks are regulated
and supervised do they differ from other types of enterprises, and
even here the difference is merely one of degree. And it is a foregone
conclusion that governmental control and supervision, no matter how
adequate, can never hope to take the place of proper management.
Consequently the inability of small bank enterprises to command the
requisite management and the lack of a satisfactory economic environ-
ment to support them will operate to face the small bank with a none
too happy future.
The admission of 590 banks to the state system in the three years
1919 to 1921 represented an increase by two-thirds. There were also
increases in national banks, but since most private banks did not seek
to obtain national charters because of larger capital requirements, the
increase among nationals was far less pronounced. This unwarranted
increase in a very short time in incorporated banking facilities resulted
in unnecessary competition and excessive duplication in many com-
munities. Although there was an abatement in banks organized after
1921, there was, nevertheless, a continual succession of new banks
with little regard to existing facilities and needs.
For a number of years new charters were granted as fast or faster
than old banks failed or consolidated. In Chicago the number of
banks increased, whereas in the remainder of the state it was already
declining. Only as failures and absorptions became more frequent
toward 1927 and 1928 did the number of banks operating show signifi-
cant net declines from year to year.
The pressure for new bank charters had greater success among
national banks than state banks. The new national charters granted
were relatively larger in number as compared with losses of national
banks than among the state banks. Perhaps in part this may be ex-
plained in terms of the vast increase in state charters which had taken
place prior to 1922 and which precluded the continued issuance of new
state charters to the same extent as national charters.
Even more significant than the issuance of new charters was the
instability of these new banks, which were, on the whole, less stable
than the old. This condition continued to manifest itself even after
1924, when the capital requirements of new state banks were raised to
a minimum of $25,000.
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The continued granting of new charters by both state and national
authorities in the face of a continual loss in banks must be construed
as an unsound procedure. The economic environment was inadequate
to support the banks already in operation, and yet new enterprises
were permitted to start. Furthermore these new enterprises, although
not handicapped by the deficiencies that the older banks had accumu-
lated, were soon bogged in the same entanglements and difficulties.
It seems likely that this heavy mortality rate among new banks
chartered after 1921 was due in part to the fact that some of them
were not new in fact, but only in name. Some of these new banks
represented new corporations that succeeded old ones or that retained
some of the same officers and at times some of the same assets and
liabilities. Occasionally the demise of one bank led to the establish-
ment of a new enterprise to take its place with little or no prospect of
a better future.
Although the turnover of banks was due in part to consolidations
and absorptions, by far the largest losses in numbers were attributable
to receiverships, involuntary liquidations, and suspensions. In Chicago
the consolidations and absorptions were relatively more numerous in
explaining losses of facilities than in the other areas of the state.
About one out of each four bank closings in Chicago was due to
absorption or consolidation.
Nevertheless the actual turnover of banks was very rapid and of
large proportions. The more than average increase in number of banks
in Chicago was accompanied by and followed by a greater than average
number of losses.
Even though consolidations and absorptions were relatively more
important in Chicago, losses due to receivership and liquidations were
not relatively less important. Bank turnover, irrespective of the cause,
was far greater in Chicago than in the rest of the state.
The cycle of bank growth and shrinkage from 1921 did not follow
the same pattern in communities of various sizes. The lower capital
requirements in effect prior to 1924 made it particularly easy to
organize small banks in small communities. It was in small towns and
villages that the greatest growth in new banks occurred in these earlier
years. Consequently when the mortality of banks became high, it was
but natural to find that the greatest relative losses in bank facilities also
took place in smaller towns.
Although there is a distinct tendency for fewer of the small towns
to have banks than the large towns, the actual percentage of banks in
the small towns which went out of business was not so very much
larger relative to the number in small towns than was the case in larger
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towns. One significant difference is found, however, in the fact that a
bank loss in a small community often deprived the town or village of
its facilities since there was frequently but one bank in small com-
munities. Even though bank losses were heavy among larger towns
and cities, the failure of some of their banks did not always deprive
them of banking facilities.
In another respect the losses of banks in larger communities Avere
not so serious. If there are several banks in a community there is
always opportunity for consolidations, absorptions, or assumption of
the assets and liabilities of one bank by another. Such changes were
relatively more common in larger towns and cities, and hence losses
to depositors were frequently avoided by a method less feasible in the
small towns.
In another respect the banks in larger towns and cities have im-
proved their status whereas those in smaller communities have failed to
do so, or have failed to do as well. The consolidations, failures, and
other reductions in numbers of banks have markedly increased the
population per bank or the potential customers per bank.
The population per bank doubled and tripled between 1920 and
1935 in the larger towns and cities, but did not show an equally signifi-
cant improvement in the small communities. These changes have been
due to the dual movements in banks and population. While popula-
tion was declining or just holding its own in small towns and country
areas, it was growing in the cities. Furthermore, the losses in bank
outlets, particularly in multiple-bank towns, gave a much greater popu-
lation per bank in the larger towns and cities.
In other ways the larger towns have gained at the expense of the
small. The loss of the town bank frequently drove the town merchants
and farmer customers to seek banking facilities elsewhere. But instead
of going to another small town that has a bank they are now more
likely to go to a larger town, even though it may be somewhat farther
away. Not only do they take their bank trade with them, but quite
frequently this new town becomes their headquarters for general trade
and shopping purposes as well.
Although not pronounced, there was a definite tendency for .the
number of banks lost to decrease according to the size of the town.
Thus in towns of less than 2,000 population, by 1935 the number of
banks operating was somewhat less than half of the number operating
in 1921. For towns of 2,000 population or more, the banks operating
by the end of 1935 were somewhat more than half of the 1921 total.
Chicago, which was an important exception, had only 30.2 per cent as
many banks in 1935 as it had in 1921.
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Because of the fact that many larger towns and cities that in 1921
had several banks by 1935 frequently had only one or two banks, there
was an actual increase in the aggregate number of banks in the larger
one-bank towns and in the larger two-bank towns.
There is a marked tendency for the national banks to constitute
a relatively larger portion of the total luimber of banks as the size of
city increases, indicating in part the inability of small towns to support
national banks, which for the most part have had a higher minimum
capital during the years studied than the state banks.
Not only are national banks a larger percentage of the banks as size
of town increases, but in the period 1921 to 1935 they constituted an
increased proportion of the entire number for virtually every size of
town. This was due not only to the relatively larger number of new
national banks chartered during these years, but also to the better
survival record of the national banks. With the present apparent
advantages of national charters over state charters, due to elimination
of double liability, exemption from social security taxes, and the fact
that federal insurance does not relieve state-bank shareholders of
assessments on their stock in case of failure, the new charters of the
last two years have bolstered the national system instead of the state
banks. Thus the trend towards a greater relative number of national
banks in Illinois has been further accentuated.
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